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THE ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURES O F  HUMAN 
EXISTENCE IN BARTH AND HEIDEGGER- 
TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF FELLOWSHIP 
by Sueo Oshima 
The history of theology is by no means the history of progress, not simply 
the transmitted results of what has already been achieved in previous periods. 
It is the history of the reconstruction and restatement of doctrines concern- 
ing the subject matter. This is so, first, because the formulation of doctrines 
is limited by the fundamental notions and formulae fashioned in each period. 
Secondly, theology is to be seen as an ever-renewed self-examination of faith 
in accordance with the shift of cultural environment. Faith has t o  understand 
itself as true to  its ground (the grace of God), yet articulated in terms of the 
new modes of thinking. 
Classical theology is heavily dependent upon that dimension of Greek 
philosophy which has developed the ontology of being qua being: the change- 
less idea beyond the contingent world. In such an understanding of reality a 
correspondence between God and man was established on the ground of 
natural being. Classical theology suggested that the proper category for 
understanding the relationship between God and man is reason (lumen 
naturale), corresponding to the understanding of God and man in terms of 
idea or logos and of rational animal respectively. In  this context the relation- 
ship between God and man was formulated in terms of Being (esse) and entity 
(ens), and consequently analogia entis was considered to  be the proper way 
to state the relationship between the two. 
In Reformation theology, however, the correspondence between God and 
man was no longer formulated on the ground of natural being, but on the 
ground of the subjectivity of both God and man. Calvin understood that. the 
order of nature and justice implanted in the human heart is recognized not 
by reason, but by the inner voice (i.e., the conscience), which distinguishes 
good from evil.' Calvin modified the classical understanding of natural law 
from the perspective of the conscience, which is interpreted as a subjective 
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version of natural law. His doctrine breaks radically with the scholastic un- 
derstanding of a correspondence among God, world, and man on the ground 
of natural reason and being. By making such a shift from natural reason to 
conscience, Calvin rejects both a substantialist view of reason, based on the 
divorce between the world of creation and the Creator, and also the Aristo- 
telian concept of a universe which is governed and controlled by its own 
principles (taphyseionta). Secondly, he emphasizes human conscience which 
operates inits immediate relationship to the continuous act of divine grace. If 
conscience is nothing but an existential response to the revealed God, Calvin's 
God is neither the absoluteidea nor the purpose of the world, but the personal 
God. An analogical relationship between God and man is therefore to be 
established on the correspondence between the address of the divine subject 
and the response of the human subject. It is from this perspective that Calvin 
condemns pagan philosophers who are independent of and ungrateful for 
God, in spite of their sharp and penetrating investigations in the field of 
science.2 
Just as classical theology was heavily dependent upon the ontology of 
nature, liberal theology has been influenced by Descartes, who was interested 
in a religion based on the modern world-view, and by Kant, whose second 
critique was preoccupied with the problems of human freedom and subjec- 
tivity. As far as its emphasis on human subjectivity is concerned, liberal the- 
ology stands in the Reformation tradition. The effort of liberal theology was 
to interpret traditional doctrines in terms of an understanding based on a 
modern world-view. Indeed, German idealism attempted to establish the 
reality of God on the ground of the transcendence of the human subject. The 
problem of liberal theology, however, is rooted in its inadequate understand- 
ing of human existence, an inadequacy inherent in the modern world-view. 
Our modern world, governed by scientific and technological reason, stands 
under the influence of the tradition of the Cartesian ego. The Cartesian ego 
is the reality which cannot be doubted, occupying a central position as the 
principle of stability in the midst of change and mutability of experience. It 
1s interpreted in terms of Aristotelian ontology as substance, and for this 
reason ego is understood as a mere entity (res cogitans). This ego, which 
takes itself as self-evident, grasps ego out of itself, closes in upon itself, result- 
ing in nothing but solitary man. This approach ignores the fundamental 
problem of man, for it is in this very mode of human existence that the 
problems of loneliness, meaninglessness, and the loss of self in society arise. 
In the nineteenth century an optimistic atheist could, on the basis of 
humanism, set up a system of values which might provide a priori norms for 
society, morality, and culture (Feuerbach). Today however, Sartre thinks 
that it is very frustrating that God does not exist, for it means that man can- 
not transcend human subjectivity. Sartre's existentialism reveals the natural 
conclusion which is to be drawn from the self-consciousness of the Cartesian 
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ego. The self is bound to itself in such a way that it cannot extricate itself. 
This would indicate that Sartre's freedom (being) is still bondage (nihil). In 
such an understanding of reality we cannot find an analogical relationship 
between God and man, and between Being and man, and for this reason our 
historical world is characterized in terms of contradiction and absurdity. In 
fact, an existentialist concept of decision does not provide an ontological 
foundation for human freedom, but mereIy describes the fact of experience. 
As long as man, therefore, remains an independent or a solitary man, he 
finds himself to be such a genuine question to himself that the alleged self- 
evident ego of Descartes becomes a self-deception and falsehood.3 Heidegger 
expresses this state of hunran existence as "thrown into the world" without 
having the means to transcend its condition out of itself. 
It is from such a perspective of contemporary understanding of man and 
reality that the medieval Christian world-view has received the attention of 
thinkers who have seen the essence of man as both historical and p e r ~ o n a l . ~  
In the medieval world, reality was discovered to be personal (Anselm).s Medi- 
eval theology, however, did not develop its own theology on the ground of 
the categories proper to  the personal and historical world,6 but merely used 
the logic of Greek ontology (Thomas). 
It is widely agreed that the task of both theology and philosophy is to 
demonstrate convincingly the intelligibility of ultimate reality by developing 
a way of thinking according to the categories proper to  its subject-matter. 
The logic of Aristotle was not just a formal logic. Rather, it was inseparably 
related to his metaphysics of natural being. The historical world, however, 
is not the reality with which Aristotle was concerned. Thus the Greek concept 
of God and man based on the Aristotelian concept of substance hardly does 
justice to the Christian concept of God and man as historical and personal.' 
Our task of theology, therefore, is to develop theology on the ground of 
categories which are proper to  both historical and personal realities. Indeed, 
the world in which Christians live is neither the object of understanding 
(Dilthey) nor the inner self, but the world of fellowship and acts unfolded 
between God and man and between man and man, on the ground of love and 
freedom. Christian community, however, exists within a complex world, 
which affords different perspectives on reality. Thus on the one hand theology 
as a cultural reality has to assimilate cultural elements in order to understand 
itself better, and on the other hand it must oppose alien philosophical per- 
spectives in order to keep its integrity. Theological truth is constituted by 
this polarity. 
I think, therefore, that one task of contemporary theology is to reflect on 
itself in the perspective of the ontology of act, which presupposes the per- 
sonal and historical world (the world of I and Thou). In other words, our 
task is to construct theology on the ground of the historical world, whereas 
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orthodoxand liberal theologies are based on the self-identity of natural being 
and on the freedom and subjectivity of the individual person respectively. 
Since Barth and Heidegger both claim that their understanding of man 
and reality is based on the categories proper to  the historical world, I will 
place primary emphasis in this paper on the ontological structures of human 
existence, which play a crucial role in  the clarification of the structures of the 
historical world. The comparison between the two will result in the old theo- 
logical tradition which took philosophy seriously. This does not imply, how- 
ever, that Barth's doctrine of man is identical with Heidegger's anthropology. 
On the contrary, the study will first show what kinds of philosophical think- 
ing Barth appropriates in his theology,8 and secondly it will reveal the limita- 
tions of Heidegger's approach to  reality. 
As far as the correspondence between God and man is concerned, Barth 
rejects analogia entis through his analogia relationis et Jidei, and Heidegger 
dismantles analogia enfis through his ontoIogica1 difference. The difference 
between Barth and Heidegger will be found in the fact that the former accepts 
a version of the Platonic two-worlds view, and thinks of the correspondence 
between God and man a t  the place (topos) of the Christ event and the 
church. The latter presupposes the collapse of the Platonic two-worlds view, 
and deals with the relationship between Being and man primarily at the 
place of the act of poetizing. It cannot be denied, however, that they share a 
common concern to the extent that the fundamental matrix in which both 
think of the relationship between God and man, and between Being and man, 
has shifted from the natural world to the historical world. That  is to say, 
both thinkers discover reality neither in the matrix of nature qua fixed order, 
nor in the inner world of human subject opposed to nature, but in the 
historical events in which God and Being unveil themselves to man, and in 
which man transcends himself toward God and Being respectively. Both 
thinkers understand the natural world as an  abstraction from the historical 
world. They further understand the analogia entis, which has its proper 
place in the static view of nature, as an  abstraction of both the analogia 
relationis between God and man and the ontological difference between 
Being and entities, which unveil the innermost core of reality as historical. 
Since Barth and Heidegger both think that the primordial reality o r  the 
deepest core of reality is event, they understand man, time, space, world, 
Being, and God from the perspective of concrete reality. Concrete reality 
for Barth is the fellowship and history unfolded within the trinitarian God, 
between God and man in Jesus Christ, and between man and man; for 
Heidegger it is the inseparable relatedness (identity) and tension (difference) 
between Being and entities. Through such new approaches to reality they 
offer a possibility for the reformulation of the traditional correspondences, 
and the establishment of a new correspondence, between God and man, and 
between Being and man. 
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The starting-point which is common both to theology and to philosophy 
in the contemporary perspective is the fact that man is a genuine question 
to 11imselP and consequently he inescapably asks that question.'Q Or per- 
haps it should be said that the sting of the anthropological question belongs 
to the very essence of man,ll for man is not self-understandable.'? This is in 
radical antithesis to an optimistic humanism which presupposes the essence 
(Wesen) of human existence as self-understandable.13 Barth obviously ac- 
cepts this fundamental understanding of man when he affirms that "we 
cannot allow human self-knowledge to begin with that unlimited self- 
confidence.. ., because we are not able to see the essence and nature of 
man apart from the Word of God."14 
The philosophical and theological grounds for this widely held view con- 
cerning the essence of man are found in the fact that man exists in his 
transcendental relationship to ultimate reality, and yet he cannot really grasp 
his ontological ground owing either to his sin or to  his inauthentic existence. 
The fact that man becomes a question to himself indicates that nothing 
emerges out of his own being, and for this reason he has been driven to the 
question of his own being. Heidegger describes this situation of human 
existence by stating that regarding human existence, "in its very Being, that 
Being is an issue for it," for it is distinguished from other entities in that it is 
ontological and transcendental.15 In the language of Barth, it may be said 
that man is in a relationship to another Being which transcends his natural 
and ethical life to such an extent that it is in this transcendent Being that 
man seeks himself.16 It is always in this act of self-transcendence that Barth's 
real man and Heidegger's authentic existence exist properly and correctly.17 
Barth and Heidegger, therefore, understand the essence of man not in terms 
of a self-closed substance but in terms of his self-opening relationship to the 
ultimate reality which transcends man. 
Heidegger understands the most immediate self-manifestation of human 
existence as being indifferent to itself as well a s  to ontological investigation.lX 
What is to become phenomenon19 is hidden, for the Being which is to be 
revealed in the self-transcendence of human existence remains vague and 
imprecise in our everyday life.10 According to Heidegger, the man in the 
world of science beIongs to this stage of human existence, for in the realm 
of scientific investigation Being in itself is forgotten. Heidegger's concept of 
inauthentic existence may be compared to Barth's concept of shadow man 
to the extent that in the state of shadow man, human subject is regarded as 
natural being (Naturwesen)?l and the question of its real subject is not 
raised as yet.22 The human phenomena's with which science and philo- 
sophical idealism concern themselves are mere abstractions from the con- 
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Crete relationship between man and the transcendent Being, the concrete 
relationship which is the real meaning and significance of human existence.24 
To  exist as real man, according to Barth, is to step out of the sphere in 
which man is one natural phenomenon among others, and to step into the 
sphere where the phenomenon in question is man himself, not only as what 
he is, but also as the subject of an act which constitutes human life.25 Man 
is the projector of self-transcendence, first seeing and understanding himself 
as a natural being, then advancing from nature to freedom. Nevertheless, the 
ethical and the natural understandings of man both grasp man only in the 
perspective of a self-closed reality (eine in sich geschlossene Wirklichkeit).zb 
Since idealism and naturalism both confine themselves to the framework of 
mind and body respectively, they are in the strict sense immanentism. Unlike 
naturalism and idealism, existentialism emphasizes not so much the self- 
grounded, self-resting, and self-moving entity as the historicity of man and 
his basic openness to the other.z7 
In Barth's view, however, existentialism does not disclose the fact that 
"the rent tearing human existence to its depth is healed in virtue of a historical 
relation to genuine transcendence."" In existentialism, therefore, the split 
and the opposition between existence and transcendence do  not really exist, 
and for this reason there cannot be any historical relationship between the 
two. To  this extent even existentialism is understood as immanentism, the 
immanentism which consists of the equation between transcendence and 
immanence. The shift from idealism to existentialism, however, impIies that 
the thoughtful student now arrives at  the limit or the horizon of human 
existence where he concerns himself with real subject and Being.29 Indeed, 
Heidegger's Sein und Zeii is an analysis of the relationship between the 
transcendence of human existence and the disclosure of Being in terms of 
horizon, or the worldhood of the world. That is to say, Being as the horizon, 
or the significance of the world, which is hidden from inauthentic existence 
which exists idly within the world, emerges for authentic existence when the 
latter transcends itself and the world in order to construct the authentic 
world.30 
In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger describes the Umwelt (environment) which 
governs man's ways of living as corrupted. Since a man involved in inauthen- 
tic existence is influenced by a common opinion of society and does not 
find his own self, he is a depraved person from whom Being is hidden. 
Heidegger places a great deal of emphasis upon the real situation of man. 
This emphasis betrays the influence of Nietzsche's nihilism and transvalua- 
tion of Platonism.31 In Was ist Metaphysik? Heidegger locates the tendency 
to depravity in nihil, for man's existence is stuck to nothingness. Heidegger's 
problem, therefore, is to overcome nihilism, Barth's problem of human 
freedom and divine grace may be seen in the same perspective, As has al- 
ready been mentioned, Sartre's freedom unveils itself as bondage to itself, 
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and consequently the problem of freedom involves both human volition 
(being) and the incapability of stepping out of the state of bondage (non- 
being). 
The issue is how man, starting with his concrete freedom which involves 
both being and non-being, can establish God and Being as the ontological 
ground. Heidegger solves this problem through man's finite freedom 
(geworfener Entwurf) which by definition implies both non-being (finitude) 
and being (freedom). Old metaphysical questions are raised when man is 
pushed to the limit of existence beyond which nothing can be expected any 
more: "Why are there entities rather than nothing? Why are we living?" 
Through the disclosure of nihil man finds his inauthentic dependence upon 
entities. The consciousness of loneliness, meaninglessness, and evil indicates 
that radical evil, or original sin (nihil), has its roots in the ground of con- 
scious self (Kant), and in the ontological foundation of the ordinary man 
who forgets the problem of self and Being. A person cannot grasp this 
radical evil, for it is incomprehensible (nihio and consequently it escapes the 
awareness of the ordinary man who lives inauthentically within the world of 
entities. As a reality manifested in the ground of the subject, however, 
radical evil belongs to the subject (being) and for this reason man is respon- 
sible for the radical evil which emerges out of the depth of his existence. 
Through his awareness of original sin and evil (non-being), therefore, man 
is aware of his own self (being). More precisely, the revelation of the grace 
of Barth's God and the disclosure of Weidegger's Being enable man to realize 
his sin and his inauthentic existence (nihil) and to open himself to the grace 
of God and Being. In other words, the Cartesian ego can realize its own core 
of truth when the realm of consciousness is broken through and a realm of 
a still more primordial self is revealed.32 Human freedom may be influenced 
by the depravity of environment, but the former transcends the Iatter when 
man separates himself from the environment through the means of an 
authentic existence which dwells poetically in the disclosure of Being. In 
the early Heidegger, finite freedom corresponds to an empty disposition 
(Befi'ndlichkeiz). In the later Heidegger, however, it corresponds to man's 
counter-project (Gegenwurj] which responds to the project of Being (Wurj' 
des GeschicksJ.33 Authentic man exists only in his transcendental relatedness 
to, and dwelling in, the disclosure of Being. This is Heidegger's concept of 
ontological difference between Being (authentic existence) and entities 
(inauthentic existence). Based on this statement by Heidegger, Barth's under- 
standing of existentialism in terms of immanentism is not necessarily correct, 
for Heidegger's ontological difference entails the event which happens to 
man through the discIosure of Being. 
It is possible to find, therefore, a similarity between Barth and Heidegger. 
Both hold the historical and ontological understanding over against the 
substantialist and ontic understanding concerning man and reality. To in- 
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terpret human existence as an entity is to forget that its essence is in its 
Existenz, the analysis of which shows its essence as transcendence: the 
realization of its potentiality for Being. It is only in the act of self-realization 
and transcendence that Heidegger's authentic existence and Barth's real 
man exist. Apart from this transcendental relationship to  ultimate reality, 
man is neither real man nor authentic existence any longer, and consequently 
he is not human at all. It is a well known fact that the modes of being of 
Aristotelian existence are rooted in the modes and ways in which an entity 
exists in the natural world. In a similar way, it is not without reason that 
the theme of Sein und Zeit, having to do with human existence, is not a 
philosophical anthropology but a fundamental ontology, an investigation 
of Being as such and in general.34 Barth also grasps the doctrine of creation 
in general in the human sphere, where the relationship between the Creator 
and the created is revealed.35 God's plan of creation is hidden in the non- 
human sphere of creation. The emphasis Heidegger and Barth put on the 
centrality of man in the understanding of Being in general entails the fact 
that they think of the historical world in terms of the real world and of the 
natural world as an abstract and deficient dimension of the historical world. 
For Heidegger, the diverse scientific problems raised by man posit them- 
selves inside of and in subordination to the fundamental problem of Being, 
whereas the fundamental ontological question is raised out of the existence 
of man characterized as questioner. For Barth, on the other hand, the 
phenomenon of man as the aspect of natural science and philosophical in- 
vestigations can equally point away from as well as toward real man. As 
phenomenon, human existence is indifferent, neutral, and ambiguous in 
regard to real man, for it can point to the essential unity of man with sur- 
rounding reality as well as to his difference from it.36 It would appear, 
therefore, that Barth's analysis of the phenomenon of man is almost exactly 
the same as Heidegger's analysis of inauthentic existence in which what is to 
become phenomenon is hidden.37 Since science deals with the mere ab- 
straction from the real man who exists in his historical relationship with 
God, it cannot unveil the real relationship between God and man.38 Indeed, 
science is concerned with Barth's phenomenal man, who is external to  real 
man, and with Heidegger's inauthentic existence, which does not function 
as the phenomenon through which Being discloses itself. On the other hand, 
theological anthropology concerns itself with real man and phenomeno- 
logical ontology concerns itself with authentic existence. 
On first appearance, Barth's position is clear enough, Theological anthro- 
pology is carried out at the place of the Christ event. Consequently, even 
Heidegger's fundamental ontology is concerned with the phenomenon which 
is external to Barth's real man. A closer look at Barth's position, however, 
reveals a perspective which is quite ambiguous. In the first place, even Barth's 
phenomenal man has the potentiality to separate himself from the depraved 
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environment. Secondly, as will be discussed more fully in the next section, 
the trinitarian God and the Christ event are defined by Barth in terms of 
authentic existence "for others," whereas man is defined in terms of inauthen- 
tic existence "with others."39 For this reason there is a possibility of changing 
man from inauthentic being-with-others to  authentic being-for-others, even 
though it is quite difficult to carry out such a shift apart from the Christ 
event. Certainly, Barth's real man, who is open to the Christ event, is quite 
different from Heidegger's authentic existence, which poetically dwells in 
the disclosure of Being. There is, however, a similarity in thought structure 
between Barth's real man and Heidegger's authentic existence. Here is a 
locus for establishing an analogy between God and man, and between Being 
and man, which Barth and Heidegger express in terms of analogia relationis 
etfidei and ontological difference respectively. 
A difference between Barth and Heidegger is first found in the fact that 
Barth's God as the ontological ground of man exists apart from man, 
whereas Heidegger's ontological ground as Being is the authentic and pri- 
mordial world which discloses itself solely in the self-transcendence of 
human existence. A second difference may be found in Barth's statement 
that theological anthropology has not to do  with the potentiality but with 
the reality of real man.40 According to Barth, man existing in tension is only 
a possibility for and never an actuality of Being.4' His existence is trans- 
formed from mere possibility to reality only when the transcendental Other 
comes to man in the midst of his di~tress.~2 A person never discovers his 
potentiality for Being unless it is offered to him through the revelation of 
God. Indeed, God's encounter with man is realized through the address of 
the Word by which the Creator breaks through to the creature, and in this 
way man is opened up for God.43 TO hear the Word of God seriously is to 
respond to His call and consequently to transcend solitary ego and open the 
self-closed "I" to the divine "Thou." Therefore, Barth finds a difference 
between his anthropology and existentialism. On the one hand, Barth's 
anthropology presupposes the fact that concrete history (Geschichte) un- 
folds itself primordially between the address of God and the response of 
man. On the other hand, existentialism claims that man has primordially 
abstract historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) apart from real interaction between 
the two subjects.44 
Barth's criticism of existentialism may not be applicable to Heidegger's 
ontology. Heidegger implicitly mentions the possibility of transcendence as 
dependent on the disclosure of Being. Therefore, Heidegger's differential 
ontology may also be called a relational ontology which is based on an 
analogia r e l a t i o n i ~ . ~ ~  For the ways and modes in which man exists and in 
which he comports himself toward Being correspond to the ways and modes 
in which Being discloses itself to man.46 
In the fourth definition of the world in Sein und Zeit,47 Heidegger explains 
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the mode in which man comports himself toward the horizon of the world, 
and he uses an enigmatic phrase like was so aufleuchtet. This somewhat 
intentionally ambiguous phrase may be translated into English in two ways: 
that which thus lightens up; and that which is thus lit up. Heidegger appears 
to refer to the reality which lurks in the reciprocal relationship between the 
revelation of Being and the transcendence of man. Apart from the dis- 
closure of Being, man has no capacity for gaining access to Being, and, con- 
sequently, his capacity for transcendence is no longer a natural givenness 
innate to him (lumen naturale). This phrase may reveal that an event takes 
place for man through the disclosure of Being so that he is enabled to tran- 
scend himself toward Being. Lumen naturale (reason), which is the basis 
for the older natural theology, is the ontic expression of this event, which 
consists in the ontological-historical relationship between the disclosure of 
Being and the transcendence of man. 
Furthermore, Sein und Zeit reveals that this event as the unity of the 
phenomenal environment is too primordial to be possessed. It vanishes as 
soon as it is recognized. It may therefore correspond to Barth's concept of 
continual creation (creatio continua) as an event or a pure becoming, under- 
lying and preceding all perception and being." Natural and intellectual laws 
only remind us that God's faithfulness and constancy are the ontological 
foundation of creaturely activities and laws.49 This again corresponds to 
the fact that the orthodox doctrine of the Scripture in terms of literal in- 
spiration is a static image of Barth's analogia relationis between the Word 
of God and human language, and of Heidegger's ontological difference 
between the disclosure of Being and human language.50 The event which 
sustains the world of creation corresponds to, and unites itself with, the 
event which establishes man's transcendence as the response (Gegenwufl  to 
the call of Being (Wurf), the event which as destiny (Geschick) becomes the 
totality on which we embark and in which we find our vocation. Being as 
event indicates that our real freedom and transcendence are supposed to 
serve the grace of Being which sustains our freedom and transcendence. In 
the perspective of Christian theology, therefore, Heidegger's Being as event 
corresponds both to creation and to reconciliation. 
While Heidegger's Being as event is the inseparable relatedness between 
the disclosure of Being and the transcendence of man, Barth's God as event 
is a se, and consequently independent of the world. Barth's strictly theo- 
logical position therefore considers the doctrines of man and the world from 
the viewpoint of the doctrine of election, which is event and history of the 
trinitarian God.S1 The doctrine of election, however, implies the fact that 
there is no way from the autonomous self-understanding of man to the 
awareness of the free act of God and to the realization of real man, who is 
solely established by the act of divine freedom. Indeed, this awareness is 
made possible only through the Christ event, which historically takes place 
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for man. This is to  say that the being of man is not realized in his self- 
contemplation, which results in shutting himself up in himself, but by his 
hearing the Word of God. 
For Barth, the Word is the form in which the divine person is communi- 
cated to the human person.52 Man can exist in the presence of God only 
because God addresses man in His freedom. Man does not have a kind of 
substance which is addressed by God. Man does not have "something dif- 
ferent and earlier and more intrinsic, a deeper substratum or more original 
substance of being," apart from, and prior to, his act of hearing the Word of 
God.53 On the contrary, man can exist only in the history unfolded between 
the address of God and the response of man. He is man as he is summoned 
by God.54 
Man is, as he hears thls Word He 15, as he 1s awakened by this Word. He IS, as  he ralses 
hlmaelfto thls Word. He IS, as  he concentrates on this Word. He is, as, called by thls word, 
he 1s ready, and already In the act of transcending hlmself. .. . To be summoned is to be 
called out of oneself and beyond oneself si 
According to Barth, therefore, analogy or correspondence between God 
and man is not grounded in natural being but in the Word. God speaks His 
"Yes" in His election, by which He creates relationship, and calls forth entities 
into relationship to Himself. God speaks and man responds. This reciprocal 
relationship or movement is man's inlago Dei. To this extent Barth's analogy 
also includes in itself the orders both of creation and of reconciliation. In 
this analogy election and reconciliation are the archetype (Urbild) and crea- 
tion is ectype (Abbild). First, creation is grounded in election, and secondly, 
creation is supposed to conform to reconciliation by overcoming contradic- 
tions introduced by sin. Therefore, the Word of God concerns itself not only 
with the Christian world but with the entire world. Indeed, Barth's christo- 
logical approach to reality means to see the order of creation from the view- 
point of the Christ event and reconciliation. In such an understanding of 
Barth's theology, we cannot deny the fact that within the realm of the Christ 
event and the Word event his understanding of man and reality corresponds 
to that of Heidegger, which is concerned with the world of poizsis. 
Since creation and covenant, and nature and grace, are not identical, there 
is always a possibility that creation replaces covenant and nature usurps the 
role of grace. The old formula of analogia entis entails this perversion of the 
divine order, or at least an abstraction or a degradation from the real order. 
it is from such a perspective of understanding of reality that we can 
appreciate the efforts both of Sohngen and of Jiingel concerning the clarifi- 
cation of the thought structures of Barth's theology. Gottlieb Sohngen tries 
to find analogia entis in Barth's anthropology. Ens creatum (creation) as ens 
per participationem is dependent upon ens a se (God). This basic structure 
of man is applied to the doctrine of creatio per verburn Dei. Since God calls 
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forth entities into their existence by mentioning their names,S6 analogia 
nominum is understood under the concept of analogia entis. Whenever 
creatures hear the Word of God, they step into existence. We have therefore 
analogia ex auditu, auditus autem per verbum creatoris. Man has therefore 
his created being not because he participates in the being of God, but because 
his being corresponds to  the being of God by hearing His Word. According 
t o  Sohngen, this is the difference between analogia entis and anal0gia.fidei.5~ 
Sohngen's ontological concern certainly contributes to the clarification of 
the ontological structures of Barth's analogia fidei, for Barth unifies the 
order of grace with that of creation on the ground of the Word and history. 
Sohngen, however, ignores the ontological difference between reconciliation 
and creation, and between revelation and nature. This point is well taken by 
Eberhard Jiingel when he says that analogia entis et nominum results in the 
loss of revelation.58 Since in Barth's theology creation and ontology are 
enclosed in election and reconciliation, ontology has to be discussed within 
the general framework of election and reconciliation. Analogia entis validates 
itself as ontically relevant to the relationship which is solely created by the 
revelation of God in the Christ event. Barth's analogy, which is grounded in 
God's election, is solely recognized in faith. If analogy is cut off from the 
event of the Word and Heilsgeschichte, it becomes an abstraction from the 
reaI order of grace and falls back to the order of nature, where analogia entis 
has its proper place. 
It is in this context that Heidegger's ontological difference provides a 
perspective in which a person can see a difference in ontological structures 
between analogia relationis et fidei and analogia entis. Heidegger's onto- 
logical difference consists in the shift in the understanding of man from entity 
(inauthentic existence) to the Ek-sistenz (authentic existence), which poeti- 
cally dwells in the openness and revelation of Being. Just as man loses his 
faith and historicity and degrades himself in the order of entities, analogia 
relationisetfideifalls back into analogia entis. From the purely philosophical 
perspective, therefore, Barth's analogia relationis and Heidegger's ontological 
differencemay point to a similar phenomenon of man, to the extent that both 
reai man and authentic existence are in process of transcending themselves 
toward ultimate reality. According to Hegel, this is the essence of religion. 
III 
In the previous section, a discussion was given of the possibility of gaining 
access to the ontological ground both of real man and of authentic existence 
through the phenomenological approach. Since real man can exist solely in 
fellowship and historical interaction both with Jesus Christ (the Word) and 
with God, Barth can appropriate phenomenological method at the place of 
the Christ event in order to discover man's ontological ground. For, first of 
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all, the phenomenological approach is an effort to gain access to our primor- 
dial experience (zu den Sachen selbst). And secondly, Barth's primordial 
reality is the I-Thou fellowship between God and man as unveiled at the 
place of the Christ event, even though its archetype is found in the trinitarian 
fellowship of God, the God who exists apar t  f rom our  world. Jus t  a s  
Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of human existence based on the 
disclosure of Being rejects both positivism and idealism, Barth's doctrine of 
man concerns itself with the refutation of the understanding of man from the 
viewpoints of naturalism, idealism, and existentialism, on the ground of the 
primordial experience which is unveiled at the place of the Christ event 
through the revelation of God. We may say, therefore, that Husserl's concept 
of intentionality is transposed by Heidegger and Barth into the concepts of 
the disclosure of Being (event) and the establishment of the I-Thou fellowship 
between God and man, and man and man at the place of the Christ event, 
respectively. To this extent it may be said that for both Heidegger and Barth 
immanent phenomenology does not contradict transcendental ontology. 
Indeed, phenomenology points to ontology, and ontology provides the 
ground for the phenomenological approach to ultimate reality. This is the 
essence of the ontology of history, which consists in the unification between 
contingent phenomenon and its ontological ground. Barth's christological 
approach to reality structurally resembles Heidegger's ontology of history. 
For Jesus Christ, a historically contingent man, is at  the same time the God 
who is the ontological ground of history. This is the theological and philo- 
sophical ground for Barth's equation between the being, the essence 
(concept), the name, and the revelation of God. In the case of Heidegger, the 
disclosure of Being as event enables man to realize his authentic existence, 
and consequently to unify historical phenomenon with its ontological 
ground.59The ontological ground is for both thinkers no longer the unmoved 
highest entity, but the event which creates authentic history by changing man 
from inauthentic existence to  authentic existence.60 As has been mentioned 
already, this is the essence of Barth's analogia relationis and Heidegger's 
ontological difference. 
Barth attempts to show this event, a unity or a complete merger between 
phenomenology and ontology, from the perspective of salvation history. 
The phenomenological study of the history of IsraeI inevitably points to its 
ontological ground, whereas God's election, the ontological ground of 
history, realizes itself within the history both of Israel and of the church. 
On the one hand, Barth's careful study of the Scriptures from the per- 
spective of faith proves Jesus Christ to be the meaning and purpose of the 
existence of Israel. It is in the name and existence of Jesus Christ that we find 
the decision of God as an event in human history (menschlich-geschichtliches 
Ereignis).6' If faith proves itself as a temporal form of reconciIiation,6' the 
church vindicates itself as a historical form of the work of the Holy Spirit 
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and faith.63 On the other hand, Barth's ontological approach to the doctrine 
of election shows that predestination is an  eternal happening (Geschehen). 
Consequently, the reality of election is neither a being which is static and 
isolated [from human history] (eines abgeschlossene und unbewegte Sein),6J 
nor the schema and program of history, but history itself and event itself.65 
Barth's God certainly exists beyond this world, and for this reason He is 
aseitas. His God, however, contains in Himself decision, event, and history, 
for His essence consists in His trinitarian fellowship and history. Further, 
God's decision, event, history, and feIlowship are the archetypes for authentic 
decision, event, history, and fellowship within the world to the extent that 
the former creates the latter by transforming man from inauthentic to au- 
thentic existence, and from the sinner to the reconciled. 
Barth grasps history as event in terms of primordial reality or of the inner- 
most core of reality.66 Therefore, history is not concerned with contingent 
changes within the unchanging framework of the phenomenal and natural 
world, corresponding to  the accidental changes of properties which belong 
to the unchanging substance of man. On the contrary, history is concerned 
with the change which underlies the phenomenal world, corresponding to the 
very change of the ontological status of human exi~tence.~7 This moving 
character of the ontological status of human existence is expressed in 
Heidegger's statement that human existence is ontically different from other 
entities in that it is ontological. Needless to say, this is the essence of the 
definition of man, who exists in the process of transcending himself toward 
ultimate reality. 
In the realm of the natural world, history as event is concerned with the 
occurrences on the frontier between the nonexistence and existence of nature 
(die Grenze zwischen der nicht-Existenz und der Existenz der Natur).hR The 
natural world, which appears to be governed by the fixed laws, is really 
sustained by the event which is the essence of historical reality. Heidegger 
expresses the same understanding of reality by saying that history is the 
ever-changing reality and the very change of substance which negates the 
self-identity of its essence.6Vn fact, Heidegger's Being (Seyn) is the event 
which produces the natural world out of its b ~ s o m . ~ o  Since event produces 
natural entities out of the struggle and unity between Being and Non-Being, 
it corresponds to, and unifies itself with, the event which produces an authen- 
tic world out of a chaotic and inauthentic world through the reconciliation 
which entails the transformation of man from inauthentic to authentic 
e ~ i s t e n c e . ~ '  Barth expresses this correspondence between creation and 
reconciliation by referring to the fact that creation history, and the incarna- 
tion, the resurrection, and the second coming of Jesus Christ all belong to 
the primordial history (Urgeschichte). 
In comparison with the ontology of history thus far clarified, the western 
metaphysics as well as science is a static type of thinking which forgets the 
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fact that the world of entities is a dimension of Being as event, the event 
which also enables man to respond to the call of Being. In his autonomous 
manipulation of all entities, which characterizes the western metaphysics and 
science, man refuses to respond to the call of Being and consequently pre- 
vents truth (the disclosure of Being) from its realization.7' This produces the 
world of technology (secularization) which is characteristic of western society. 
The will to control has hardened everything into the unhistorical (the loss of 
relatedness to the transcendental Being).73 Technology, metaphysics, science, 
and Hisrorie are unhistoricaI.74 Man always dominates things. In all realms 
of human life, even in ethics, man's relatedness to the transcendent Being is 
lost. From the Barthian perspective, this is the necessary consequence of 
natural man and religion.75 Thus religion is lost in the subjectivity of man. 
The result is contemporary humanism and atheism. Being ceases to  be event, 
and for this reason it is impossible for truth t o  be realized in man. 
This inadequacy of modern science and metaphysics corresponds to the 
fact that the older understanding of man in terms of substance is not ade- 
quate for a real understanding of man. The situation concerning reality just 
described further indicates that the understanding of God and Being in terms 
of the highest and static entity and absolute substance cannot provide an 
adequate ontological ground for the historical world which is characterized 
by change and development. If authentic existence and real man exist solely 
in their transcendental relatedness and comportment to ultimate reality, this 
reality is no longer the unmovable and highest entity, but the act of creating 
this relationship between itself and man. As already mentioned, the act of 
creating a relationship between ultimate reality and man is the event which 
produces authentic history. Therefore, the ontological ground of historical 
man is the Urgeschichte, which is for Heidegger the grace, openness, and 
disclosure of Being, and for Barth the grace, election, revelation, and recon- 
ciliation of God. Barth could well claim that the openness and revelation of 
his God should be the archetype for the disclosure of Heidegger's Being.76 
This is the reason why it is possible to locate Heidegger's Being at the locus 
of Barth's doctrine of creatio continua. 
The theological method of Barth is characterized by his christological 
approach to reality. This characterization implies that Barth attempts to  
understand man, world, and history from the perspective of the Christ event. 
In fact, the thought structures of Barth's anthropology as unveiled in terms 
of the thinking of relationship (Beziehungsdenken) and of the thinking of 
language (Sprachdenken) in the previous section are those which are proper 
to the Christ event. It is Jesus Christ who as the Word establishes the real 
relatedness between God and man. In a similar way, Heidegger also under- 
stands the essence of language in terms of creating reIationship (Verhiiltnis 
or Beziehung).77 
It is from the perspective of the Christ event that Barth further develops 
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his doctrine of man. Man is certainly constituted by the transcendent God, 
but God is now seen as concretely becoming the man Jesus. This suggests 
that the ontological ground of man is now shifted from the vertical to  the 
horizontal relationship. Accordingly, the ontological definition of man is 
formulated in such a way that in the midst of men the man Jesus exists. To 
be real man is to be with Jesus Christ just as the essence of man is a genuine 
togetherness with G0d.78 Man is what he is in relationship to the movement 
of the man Jesus Christ, who is the ontological ground of man, toward him. 
The being (Wesen) of man is not to be sought behind or apart from this 
movement, as if it were something (ein Etwas) in itself, which is then caught 
up in this m~vemen t . ' ~  On the contrary, man finds his reality and conse- 
quently exists when he is brought into direct encounter with, and moves 
toward, the man Jesus Christ as the witness to election and reconciliation.80 
The act of a man who responds to the call of God is at the same time the 
event which happens to him from the side of God, who is the real event, in 
order to take man into the fellowship both with the man Jesus and with God. 
This is the essence of analogia relationis etfidei, which is in turn grounded 
in the fellowship and history unfolded between the divinity and the humanity 
of Jesus Christ. 
For Barth, the divinity of Jesus Christ consists in the fact that He is man 
"for God," whereas His humanity consists in the fact that He is man "for His 
fellow-man."x' There is a divine and essential correspondence and similarity 
(eine giSttlich-wesentliche Entsprechung und k'hnlichkeit) between His being 
"for God" and His being "for His fellow-man (Mitmensch)."8' The being of 
the man Jesus is therefore not accidental but 0ntological.8~ This is to say 
that the correspondence consists in the fact that the man Jesus in His being 
"for man" repeats (wiederholt) and reflects (nachbildet) the inner being and 
essence of God, and confirms His being "for God."84 The divinity and the 
humanity of Jesus Christ, however, are united, not in terms of noumenon 
and phenomenon, but in terms of the history unfolded in their mutual act 
based on the address of God and the response of man. In other words, the 
act of the humanity of Jesus Christ is at the same time the event which 
happens to him from the side of His divinity, which is a real event, and 
consequently historical. The relationship between God and man, and between 
Jesus Christ and man, is enclosed and grounded in this history unfolded 
between the divinity and the humanity of Jesus Christ. The relationship 
between the man Jesus Christ and His disciples therefore is not original, but 
the exact copy (Nachbild) of the trinitarian fellowship and history (Urbild) 
which consists in perfect being "for others." 
Certainly, christology is not anthropology. Jesus Christ is the man strictly 
"for His fellow-man," whereas we are men "with others." Jesus Christ is 
strictly authentic existence always responding to the call both of God and of 
His neighbors, whereas man as sinner does not respond to the call both of 
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God and of his neighbors. Here we find the mystery of man. To  deny this 
mystery is to deny the continuity of human subject in the forms of a creature 
(being-with-others), a sinner (being-against-others), and a sinner saved by 
grace (being-for-others). The same man who is created to live with his fellow- 
man, can become a solitary man (sinner) apart from God and his fellow-man, 
but he can also become a being "for God" and "for his fellow-man" by 
realizing his authentic existence.85 
The definitions of the humanity of Jesus Christ in terms of being "for 
others," and of man in terms of being "with others," correspond to Barth's 
classical definitions of the relationship between covenant and creation: 
covenant is the inner ground of creation, whereas creation is the outer 
ground of covenant. A being "with others" (creation) is supposed to become 
a being "for others" (reconciliation), whereas the external form of a being 
"for others" is not solitary man but fellow-man. Barth's image of God is 
neither reason, nor conscience, but the fellowship between 1 and Thou, and 
between husband and wife. 
Therefore, for Barth, the reconciliation between God and man (analogia 
relationis et fidei) is realized only through the medium of the community 
both of Israel and of the church (being-with-others). Apart from the com- 
munity both of Israel and of the church, which is the historical and social 
ground of man, both Jesus Christ and individual Christians cannot e ~ i s t . ~ b  
Community is not therefore something extraneous to man as solitary exis- 
tence, but it forms his innermost essence. Every solitary man presupposes 
the I-Thou fellowship which is for Barth another form of the ontological 
impossibility of sin. The fact that "I" is "I" in the relationship to  "Thou" 
within the world is grounded in the I-Thou fellowship in the trinitarian God 
and between Jesus Christ and His fellow-man.8' This is the ontological 
structure of Barth's man. 
It is more than certain that Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of 
human existence does not start with man as fellow-man. Heidegger's man 
is primordially defined not in terms of being-with-others, but in terms of 
being-in-the-world. Certainly, Heidegger modified the traditional under- 
standing of entities by making it clear that things do not exist by themselves 
(Vorhandensein), but have a particular mode of existence, namely, that of 
"equipments" (Zuhandensein), which are dependent upon the act of human 
existence. It is in their "being-in-order-to" (serviceability to man), and their 
relatedness to the destination and horizon (Being) that the essence of entities 
(the traditional definition of essence) is found." Heidegger grasps the essence 
of natural entities from the viewpoint of historical world where man plays 
a crucial role. 
In this context, however, man is always understood as a solitary man. 
Furthermore, Heidegger's concept of Mitsein (mutual existence)s9 never 
implies the primordial relationship of communication which presupposes 
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human community and direct confrontation between I and Thou. Since "I" 
as being-in-the-world in its dealings with "equipments" shares the same 
world with "Thou" as being-in-the-world, "Thou" is defined neither as 
Zuhandensein nor as Vorhandensein, but as Mitsein, and our historical 
world is determined as Mitwelt (mutual world). Even in the later period of 
his development of thought when he introduces the concept of neighborhood 
(Nachbarschaft), Heidegger does not grasp the concept of community on the 
ground of the confrontation and fellowship between I and Thou, but on the 
ground of the event as gathering together between heaven and earth and 
between Gods and men.90 In the early Heidegger, therefore, Mitwelt is un- 
derstood as the totality of the atornistic and individual human existence, 
which is not created out of the fellowship between I and Thou. In the later 
Heidegger, however, it is on the ground of the event (Da-sein), which is not 
a mere individual "I" but establishes the selfhood and authenticity of man, 
that the true I-Thou fellowship is created and considered.9' 
Heidegger is to be commended in that he does not seek to understand 
"Thou" out of "I," following the model of idealism. But neither is "I" under- 
stood by Heidegger in terms of being in fellowship with "Thou," Just as 
Jemeinigkeir (my-self-hood) designates "I" as the subject which transcends 
the realm of nature, "Thou" always emerges as the subject which transcends 
the subject-object (I-It) relationship. Therefore, Heidegger's man is not 
characterized by love but by care (Sorge). In such a structure of thought, it 
is somewhat difficult to develop an ontology of love which provides the 
ground for our response to the demand and address of our  neighbor^.^* The 
ontology of love and fellowship is characterized not by dialectic but by 
dialogue. The ontological ground of love is God in Christ, who comes to, 
suffers with, and moves together with individual Christians without abolish- 
ing their freedom. Love not only forgives and accepts, but directs a sinful 
will so as to make it respond to the address of God and neighbors. In fact, 
love has its proper place in the doctrine of sanctification, which is another 
expression of human transcendence. Furthermore, the doctrine of substitu- 
tion puts an end to the concept of solitary man.93 Substitution is Christ's 
encroachment into the "my-self." Jesus Christ puts an end to the reservation 
of "I" toward God by breaking the "my-~elf."9~ He delivers a person out of 
the "I"-solitariness when "I" looks away from the "my-self' to Him.95 
Even for Heidegger, however, logos as the power for observation and 
articulation gains a communal character, corresponding to his definition of 
man as Mitsein.96 Heidegger certainly grasps logos as communication 
(Mitteilung), and listening as man's openness to others.97 Heidegger, how- 
ever, cannot develop fully this structure of language, because he grasps the 
ontological ground of history not in terms of fellowship but in terms of Being 
as event. Therefore, language is defined in a primordial way as the articula- 
tion of "Da," the disclosure of Being." The origin of language is the echo of 
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the grace of Being.99 Language is the lighting and unveiling arrival of 
Being,Ioo where authentic utterance takes place and human existence 
achieves its authenticity. Human language agrees with (homologein) the 
utterance of Being.101 If the utterance of God encourages and calls forth 
man to respond (entsprechen) to the original utterance,lo2 the utterance of 
man is in correspondence to the utterance of Being, and for this reason it is 
hearing.lo3 The authentic utterance of man, however, does not need a 
historical object which confronts him, for it is in the most profound sense 
historical (geschichtlich)."J4 To this extent, validity may be granted for 
Barth's differentiation between Christian anthropology and existential 
anthropology. As already mentioned, Barth claims that Christian anthro- 
pology is grounded in the history (Geschichre) unfolding itself between God 
and man, whereas existential anthropology is rooted in its primordia1 histo- 
ricity (Geschichtlichkeit). 
It is therefore evident that the limitation of Heidegger's philosophy is due 
to his inadequate understanding of the ontological ground of Mitsein. Since 
Being as event may not entail the concrete fellowship, communication, and 
history unfolded between two persons, but merely the impersonal ground of 
the historicity of man, it may not have an audible voice but merely voiceless 
voice (lautlose Stimme).'05 On the other hand, the Christian God is a God 
who speaks. Jesus Christ is God with us, speaking to us in His person in 
order to break into our monologue and turn it into dialogue. The trinitarian 
fellowship in God is the ontological ground of this dialogical and communal 
character of our existence and language. Indeed, there is no language apart 
from community and society.106 Objectivity of truth requires that "I" thinks 
as "Thou" has to think. Authentic language, on the other hand, which has 
been created out of the communal character of truth, is supposed to express 
the world of significance which can be seen as Heidegger's disclosure of 
Being and Barth's reconciled world. Heidegger's Mitsein is not the ontological 
ground on which authentic language and existence are to be established. On 
the contrary, authentic language and existence are established for Heidegger 
in man's correspondence to the disclosure of Being, and also when the Mitsein 
of two subjects becomes possible, on the ground of each authentic existence 
which has been thus established.'07 Community and society are grasped by 
the early Heidegger as depraved, so that for him they cannot become the 
ontological ground of human existence. 
Since Heidegger's Being consists in freedom and transcendence (Freiheit 
zuln Grunde), it may be said that for him faith has priority over love. The 
man who realizes his authenticity and transcendence through faith can truIy 
love his neighbors and establish the genuine I-Thou fellowship.108 If, how- 
ever, Being is not understood as a person who confronts man, there is a 
possibility that man forgets Being and closes in upon himself. Heidegger's 
position, therefore, is open to the possibility of lapsing into a Pelagianism. 
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The same issue is made clearer when Heidegger talks about conscience. The 
issue is "who does the calling?" Heidegger answers that in conscience "the 
call comes from me and yet from beyond me."'oY Buber's understanding 
of Heidegger suggests that Heidegger's original responsibility is found in 
man himself (Bei-sich-bleiben).llO 
Even though Buber's criticism may not be accurate, at  least one thing is 
certain. Reconciliation, justification, and sanctification are for Heidegger a 
matter related to the individual person. In the case of Barth, however, 
authenticity is produced out of the experience of conflict and enmity, for- 
giveness and love between God and man, and between man and man. There- 
fore, faith is to be understood in the perspective of our faithfulness to our 
God and neighbors within the context of our Christian fellowship and love. 
This corresponds to Barth's definition of God in terms of love and freedom. 
The reconciliation between God and man is based on the fellowship between 
I and Thou. Ourjustification and sanctification are not possible apart from 
our fellow-men in our community. This means that these doctrines are 
related to the community of Christians and not to the individual believer. 
Through our faithfulness to our fellow-men, we realize our true self, which 
is to be identified with the revelation of God (truth). In the historical world, 
truth is understood as self-identity (integrity). This self-identification is 
realized in our being-open-to-others, responding to the demand and address 
of our neighbors. This is the essence of reconciliation and sanctification. 
In this connection, Barth's assessment of the relationship between agape 
and eras is most original and interesting. According to Barth, agape and 
er6s are not rooted in an intrinsic possibility of human nature. Rather they 
are events and consequently they determine human nature through the 
historicaI and contingent event, which extrinsically happens to man when 
he loves in either way.111 Here we come to grips with a proposed ontology 
of love and act. Human nature is capable of taking either form of love on the 
ground of a contingent act of historical existence, and for this reason it can 
create history in either way. A person's ontological status changes in accord- 
ance to his way and mode of life. Consequently, the real change of the course 
of history is not due to  a potentiality inherent in human nature qua ens 
creatum, but to  man's contingent and historical decision and act in his 
existential relationship to God and his neighbors.ll2 Nevertheless, the 
proposed ontology of history is quite different from existentialism, for agape 
takes place in correspondence (Entsprechung) and er6s in contradiction 
(Widerspruch) to human nature, which is willed, posited, and ordered by 
~0d.113 
On the one hand, er5s certainly consists in a new thing which is created by 
the fact that man closes in upon himself, and in this way it has a tendency to 
make God the origin of the self-closed entity. In erGs, therefore, God becomes 
the reflection of the ontic existence of a solitary man, for whom the subject 
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and the object of love are the same self.'14 On the other hand, agape means 
self-giving within the fellowship between I and Thou. It does not mean the 
loss of the self of the subject in the object, for this brings a person back to the 
sphere of eras in which the subject and the object of love are the same self.ll5 
AgapFis essential and natural in relation to  fellow-men. Agape; however, is 
not rooted in human nature, but is a contingent occurrence to man as ens 
creatum. For it is in the quickening power of the Holy Spirit and in a new 
act of God that agape becomes an event to man.116 To this extent, agapF 
has a proper place in the doctrine of reconciliation, and undergirds the 
Barthian position which claims the priority of reconciliation (archetype) over 
creation (ectype). 
Certainly, er6s entails the self-transcendence of man.'17 To this extent, love 
is a link between the inside and the outside of man, as well as between God 
above in heaven and man below on earth. It is in love that man, existing on 
earth, can establish God as the ontological ground of history, for love is 
human transcendence toward God. Eras has a tendency to keep and to 
maintain the human ego in itself, whereas agape consists in the giving of 
one's self, which corresponds to the essence of God as defined in terms of 
love and freedom. ErSs entails merely human transcendence and freedom, 
and consequently is deficient in comparison to agapii, which consists of both 
freedom and fellowship. This comparison between the two is analogous to 
that between a solitary man and a real man.118 It can be said that agapF cor- 
responds to analogia relationis etfidei, whereas eros corresponds to  analogia 
entis. 
Even though a Buberian perspective may imply that agapeand erGs charac- 
terize the essence of man in Barth and Heidegger respectively, a Heideggerian 
position can claim that Heidegger presents a third reality which cuts across 
a strict dichotomy between the I-It relationship and the I-Thou relationship 
and provides a ground for both an I-Thou relationship and an I-It relation- 
ship. For Heidegger has clarified the event-character of both authentic 
existence and authentic language. Man is not a mere subject, but the Ek- 
sistenz which dwells in the disclosure of Being. Self-understanding is not 
self-consciousness, but authentic existence which is true and faithful to itself. 
Authentic thinking is not produced by a free and empty potentiality for 
thinking, but by its openness and response to the demand and address of 
Being. Thinking is not mereIy an act, for which man is qualified as animal 
rationale, but man is forced to think, because the world lights itself up to  him. 
In such a perspective of the understanding of reality, the work of Martin 
Buber can best be evaluated. Certainly Buber made a great contribution in 
his clarification of the dialogical principle which constitutes human existence. 
Buber grants that communication between I and Thou is made possible on 
the ground of the original relationship between God and man. It appears, 
however, that Buber does not fully articulate the ontological difference 
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between creation and reconciliation. When he talks about an innate Thou 
(eingeborenes Du), Buber refers to the capacity of saying "Thou" implanted 
in the structure of human existence as a gift of creation. In the language of 
Barth, Buber does not distinguish between being-with-others (creation) and 
being-for-others (reconciliation). For Buber expressly states that an experi- 
enced fellowship between I and Thou is a relationship of an innate T h ~ u . ~ l g  
Therefore Balthasar may be right when he criticizes Buber by pointing out 
that dialogue has to be determined primarily not by its form in terms of a 
mere conversation carried out between two parties, but by its content which 
shows the limitation of human existence.120 For even in the structure of the 
dialogical relationship between I and Thou, both I and Thou can easily de- 
grade themselves into "It." When Barth states that altruistic activity is 
inhuman if it does not derive from the summons of the one to the other, his 
concept of the neutral attitude of man is essentially the same as that of 
Heidegger's inauthentic existence, which responds to the demand of the 
others in its neutral and inhuman attitude only by following a conventional 
way. In a depraved society fellow-man easily becomes indefinite man, and 
ceases to carry on a dialogue. True dialogue takes place, however, when the 
transcendent Other comes to the helpless and depraved man, and when "I" 
suffers from the embarrassment caused by "Thou."l" This shift of reality 
within the dialogical structure of human existence corresponds to the conti- 
nuity of human subject in the forms of a creature, a sinner and a sinner saved 
by grace. Barth and Heidegger differ in that for Barth Jesus Christ never 
fails to greet man, whereas for Heidegger the disclosure of Being is still 
partially dependent upon man's realization of his potentiality for Being. 
Buber's concept of an innate Thou can be compared to Emil Brunner's con- 
cept of the point of contact. From the perspectives of Barth and Heidegger, 
Brunner's concept of responsibility as imago Dei is abstract. For Brunner 
fails to see that human responsibility presupposes human capacity for 
decision, whereas human decision corresponds to the decision of God which 
takes place prior to the human decision.12"uber and Brunner deal with a 
mere possibility, potentiality, and capacity abstracted from the reality which 
is solely actualized through the act of God's grace. An ontologicaI difference 
between creation and reconciliation can be further clarified by Barth's 
concept of gladness. Barth states that man is to be found in his essence only 
when he is joyful,l23 and that "to belong to another" as his property is man's 
bondage, in which he is no longer with his fellow-man gladly.124 Man's 
existence in gladness is the essence of the writer's proposed ontology of 
history. Such an existence witnesses to the trinitarian fellowship of God 
characterized by joy and gladness as the ontological ground both of man 
and of history, starting with man's concrete situation within history. 
Man IS essent~ally determ~ned to be with his fellow-man gladly, In the ind~cated freedom 
of the heart.. . . Openness, and speech and hearing, and mutual assistance can be real 
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only when there is also this discovery between man and man, and necessity of this "gladly," 
this frecdom, rules In their seeing and being seen, therr speech and hearing, their reciprocal 
help. This is not merely the crown of humanity, but its root.'?$ 
Unless we act and live authentically, we are not real men, and for this reason 
we have nothing to do with our ontological ground. Only our existence in 
joy can establish an authentic world, for the realization of which God con- 
tinues to work. On the other hand, our existence in joy and gladness is at 
once the direct manifestation of our ontological ground within the historical 
world. 
This paper compares Barth and Heidegger in order to demonstrate that 
theology which is based on a logic which is proper to the Christ event can 
claim its validity even within the secular world. The old tradition of analogia 
entis has been an effort to show the same issue from the perspective of 
philosophy. If theology attempts to vindicate itself within the secular world, 
its task is related to the effort to establish God as the ontological ground of 
man and history here and now, starting with concrete and historical phe- 
nomenon, and consequently to show a correspondence between God and 
man, and between the ontological ground of history and its manifestation 
as historical phenomenon. From the perspective of Barth's theology, this 
task is accomplished by creating a community of love and freedom, which 
corresponds to the trinitarian fellowship of God. Since our act of creating 
authentic community is always dependent upon the grace of God, our act 
of love and freedom unifies transcendental ontology with immanent phe- 
nomenology. In this perspective, true apologetic is not merely concerned 
with vindicating the structures of Christian faith over against other philo- 
sophical positions, but is also related to the acts of Christians who seek to 
construct the historical community as comtnunio sanctorum. It is my 
contention that the logic which is proper to authentic community established 
by the Christ event can also claim its validity within the secular world. 
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